For the complete documentation index, see llms.txt. This page is also available as Markdown.

Security and trust model

The guarantees of the protocol rest on a set of security properties and on a set of trust assumptions. A register for securities has to be auditable in its assumptions as much as in its code. This section states both plainly: what the contracts guarantee whatever anyone does, whom the protocol trusts and for what, what happens when something goes wrong, and how the code is verified.

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What it covers

Every party the protocol trusts, what for, and what bounds that trust.

The properties that hold at all times: supply, balances, gates, positions, validations, identity bindings, access.

What the protocol does on its own when something is wrong, the levers available, who holds them, and how operation resumes.

The audits, the test suites, the formal specifications, and how to report a vulnerability.

The central property is that compliance is enforced by construction, not by detection. An ineligible or non-compliant holding cannot be brought into existence: every change of ownership passes the eligibility gate and the compliance gate before it is recorded, on the chain that sees the complete distribution of the asset. There is no window in which a bad state exists and has to be caught and unwound.

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